This article examines the continuing salience of the territorial cleavage in Bavarian party politics. It does so through an exploration of the Christian Social Union's (CSU) mobilisation of Bavarian identity as part of its political project, which has forced other parties in Bavaria to strengthen their territorial goals and identities. Parties have articulated different constructions of 'Bavaria' to rival the CSU's dominant nation-building project. However, they have been unable to portray themselves as 'standing up for Bavarian interests' due to the constraints of the statewide parties to which they belong. As an exclusively Bavarian party, the CSU has no such constraints. Indeed, the CSU's core aim of strengthening Bavaria's position vis-à-vis the German federation may be viewed as akin to that of the CiU in Catalonia, Spirit in Flanders or Plaid Cymru in Wales. Like these parties, the case of the CSU in Bavaria demonstrates that substate territorial mobilisation has as much to do with negotiating autonomy within the state as seceding from it. To that end, the CSU provides a valuable case of how a regionalist party operating within a multi-level political system has sought to influence the regional, state and European levels to obtain a comparative territorial advantage. 
nation
. 12 Yet this definition also poses problems. As Hobsbawm warned, 'defining a nation by its members' consciousness of belonging to it is tautological and provides only an a posteriori guide to what a nation is. Moreover, it can lead the incautious into extremes of voluntarism which suggests that all that is needed to be or to create a nation is the will to be one.' 13 This caveat reminds us that as 'old' places are socially, politically and economically transformed, 'new' places are also created. 14 As such, any understanding of nation as a united of shared identity must acknowledge the role of actors in seeking to create, alter or prioritise a sense of belonging to a territory, and to account for their motivations in doing so. In particular, scholars have argued that political parties play a vital role in constructing nations. 15 In describing a sense of belonging to a specific territory and group of people with a shared identity, many political parties employ the term 'nation' (such as the Scottish National Party), some prefer 'people' (the Sardinian Party of Action), whilst the Christian Social Union uses the word
Heimat. Although this concept has a very imprecise meaning, Eberhard Sinner maintains that:
'Heimat means to have an identity, to have roots, a language and history, and to be aware of this'. This is not unlike some of the objective and subjective definitions of nation as discussed above.
Indeed, Sutherland has convincingly argued in this journal that the CSU's prioritisation and politicisation of the term Heimat is similar to the strategy employed by nationalist parties to prioritise the identity and interests of the nation. 16 She maintains that the CSU has reinvented the concepts of Heimat and Vaterland following the Second World War to accord to its nation-building project in Bavaria. For the CSU, Heimat evokes a sense of love and belonging to a place, people, culture and traditions, whilst Vaterland contrarily suggests responsibility and citizenship. The CSU has sought to capture feelings of identity, and to depict the Bavaria as an 'imagined community' with strong emotional and symbolic content based on a thousand-year old Bavarian history of statehood. The party has furthermore politicised this identity and linked its construction of the Freistaat Bayern to its political, cultural and socioeconomic aims of combining the social market with high-tech innovation in Bavaria, epitomised by their slogan Laptop and Lederhose. Heimat may thus be understood as a variant of 'nation' as a social construction based on a territorial community. As Sutherland argues, 'only the substitution of the term Heimat for Nation distinguishes the strategy of the CSU from archetypal nation-building policies'. 17 An objection to this association is that the CSU describes neither itself as a nationalist party, nor (in German-language official party literature) Bavaria a nation. Putting aside the subjective association of Bavaria with the stateless nations by CSU politicians, we may, however, identify some external attributes of nation that we can identify in the case of Bavaria: numerous scholars have held that a strong territorial identity exists among the Bavarian people, which has affected 5 political and cultural life in the Land, most obviously through the continuous re-election of a party that proclaims to be defender of Bavarian interests 18 ; all of Bavaria's political parties hold that Bavaria has a unique culture and traditions within the Federal Republic, including a separate dialect, cuisine, dress, and folklore; a 'reusable past' is provided for Bavarian nation-builders in the form of a long history of legislative and administrative autonomy; and a strong popular demand for selfdetermination and even independence exists amongst the Bavarian electorate. In a survey conducted by the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, Bavarians were asked whether they wanted Bavaria to have more autonomy in Germany. Whilst 57% supported more autonomy for Bavaria, 17% supported outright independence. 19 For this reason alone it could be argued that Bavaria has the same right to be analysed in the context of substate nations as Quebec, Galicia or Wales, where in the latter case only 13.9% of people support independence (in 2003 ).
Yet it is worthwhile reiterating at this point that nations are not necessarily precursors for states, and that many nations may coexist peacefully within a given 'plurinational state', which is reflected in the self-determination demands of regionalist parties. For this reason, Bavaria's popular preference for more autonomy in Germany rather than independence per se corresponds with the demands of other stateless nations in Europe. It is important to bear in mind that not all regionalist parties seek sovereign state independence. In fact, the vast majority of these parties interpret selfdetermination to mean varying degrees of autonomy such as devolution and federalism -for example Plaid Cymru, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and Union Valdotaine. 20 The CSU's goals to decentralise the German federation, and its self-definition as a Bavarian party striving to achieve maximum autonomy for Bavaria in Germany and Europe, thus placing it firmly in the same category as those regionalist parties just mentioned. This argument is returned to below. But first it is necessary to provide some background on the development of the Freistaat. In order to protect its special identity and interests in the FRG, successive Bavarian governments have continuously provided an independent, and sometimes dissident, voice in German affairs. 25 The strong territorial identity of Bavarian parties was apparent in their unanimous rejection of the German federal constitution (Grundgesetzt or Basic Law) in 1949, because it was not perceived to be federalist enough. The previous year, the Bavarian Assembly had voted upon a The CSU's success in dominating Bavarian politics can be attributed to a number of factors.
THE FREE STATE OF BAVARIA
First, it sought to advance a vision of a single Bavarian culture, to which it tied its party identity.
The Bavarian party system in the immediate post-war period was fragmented and heterogeneous, reflecting the distinct political cultures of Swabia, Franconia and Old Bavaria. On coming to power, the CSU sought to overcome the divergent regional traditions and religious cleavages that have long divided the Land. This was achieved through the promotion of an over-arching Bavarian identity that bridged the divide between the Catholic South and Protestant North, and integrated the diverse regional traditions. The CSU was, moreover, successful in tying its party identity to this homogenous Bavarian political culture. During the 1986 elections the CSU's slogan was 'Three names, a single force: Bavaria, the CSU and Strauss', while more recently the CSU adopted the straight-to-the-point command 'Vote for Bavaria'. The CSU also employed the national symbols of Bavaria -the lion and the blue diamond -as party symbols, located on the backdrop of the national flag of Bavaria. As Mintzel notes, 'it is not even necessary to add the CSU's name. In fact nearly everyone knows which party is meant'. 33 Another essential ingredient in the success of the CSU was its ability to adapt to maintain and adapt the traditional Bavarian identity to a modern industrial setting. The CSU, as party of government, was the main agent of post-war industrialisation in Bavaria, and it was able to skilfully steer the enormous socioeconomic changes brought on by rapid industrialisation in Bavaria without major disruptions to Bavarian society. 34 The CSU sought to satisfy the demands of farmers and property-owners, whilst at the same time remaining attractive to the new classes of blue-collar and white-collar workers. These diverse groups accounted for a large percentage of CSU membership, and would also provide the electoral basis of the CSU's success.
During the course of Bavaria's modernisation, the CSU underwent its own transformation, from being a party representative of Catholic-Conservative agrarian communities to being a modern, inter-confessional, broadly-based mass party. This transformation was inspired by the CSU's being ousted from office in 1954-7 by the Vierer-Koalition (Coalition of Four) of the SPD, FDP, Bavarian Party and All-German Block/Party of Refugees and Expellees (BHE). The CSU reorganised completely, undergoing a 'transformation process into a mass and machine party'. 35 The party created a broad organisational sub-structure by setting up local offices in every almost municipality, a centralisation and bureaucratisation of the party machine with qualified staff, the establishment of a weekly party newspaper, the Bayernkurier, and the foundation of a party research institute, the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Munich. The CSU's internal reorganisation and modernisation allowed it to throw off its reputation as a primarily Old Bavarian party representing agrarian interests, and transformed itself into a catch-all party, climbing back up to its 50% mark in Bavarian Landtag elections. In this way, the CSU extended itself into the Liberal and Social
Democratic political strongholds and made itself attractive to all classes. This required the accommodation of different ideological strands, ranging from right-wing populist to more liberal policies. For instance, although the party has strongly conservative social and cultural values, its support of the 'social market' -that is, market liberalism tempered by a belief in the responsibility of the state to care for its citizens -as well as an emphasis on subsidiarity, enabled the party to appeal to the middle ground. The party's advocacy of inter-confessional Christianity also allowed it to appeal to the Protestant communities of northern Bavaria and the Catholic communities of the
South. Yet the party's transformation did not entail a desertion of its strong regional identity.
Instead, the CSU was able to use its vast new government and political resources to shape a strong, conservative and patriotic Bavarian political culture, 36 by integrating the various regional traditions through the use of the media, control of the state bureaucracy, and its numerous and powerful local organisations. As Sutherland argues, the CSU was able to dominate the social and 'institutional discourse' of Bavaria, and set the political agenda, by virtue of its powerful position in Bavaria.
Finally, a key determinant of the CSU's success was the decision not to restrict its activities and demands to the Bavarian political arena. In 1947-9 the CSU negotiated an agreement with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), enabling it to participate in federal politics as part of the Christian Democratic parliamentary group and fill Cabinet posts in CDU-CSU governments. This did not threaten the CSU's independence -which was manifested through separate party programmes and congresses, organisational and membership structures, and the existence of a CSU Landesgruppe in the Bundestag. Had the CSU not made this pact, which cemented its commitment to both federalism in Germany and regionalism in Bavaria, it is likely that it would have become another local party pursuing a 'radical separatist patriotism'. 37 This is precisely what happened to its main rival in the 1950s, the Bayernpartei. The BP stood for the Catholic, conservative and agrarian traditions of the rural communities of Old Bavaria and its main slogan, 'Bavaria for Bavarians' (Bayern den Bayern) captured the party's patriotism. It won more than 17.9% of the vote in the 1950 Landtag election, causing great concern within the CSU. At the same time, the BP's brief electoral success catalysed the CSU's transformation into a modern, inter-confessional catch-all party and from the early 1960s the BP 'never recovered from the resounding defeat the CSU, further reducing its support base. Moreover, whilst the CSU sought to secure Bavaria's autonomy by achieving a more strongly federalised German Republic, the BP moved from support for radical federalism to outright separatism in order to avoid being dominated by the 'Prussians'.
The BP's refusal to modernise and appeal to a voter base beyond the Catholic, rural population of Old Bavaria meant that since the 1960s the BP has constituted a 'micro-party' unable to capture more than 5% of the vote.
Meanwhile, the CSU has explicitly stated that its aims are to achieve more influence and autonomy for Bavaria -both formally through the decentralisation of powers to the Länder within Germany, and informally through Bavaria's para-diplomatic relations with other regions and states in Europe. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the CSU should be understood as a nationalist party that seeks maximum sovereignty for Bavaria: 'The CSU rhetorically expresses love for the Bavarian Heimat and the need to preserve and defend it in much the same way as nationalists prioritise the nation… the ideology of the CSU is nothing other than a nationalist one'. 38 This argument is corroborated by politicians and civil servants in the state chancellery, who argue that 'we are a nation in the German context, and also in a European context.' 39 The CSU has realised that it can wield more power and influence within federal German and European structures if it supports federalism rather than independence. This means that, as much as being a regionalist party, the CSU also plays the German federal game. The party is a staunch supporter of a strong type of federalism, which is based on decentralisation of the maximum degree of authority to the Länder, greater policy autonomy, and a more powerful Bundesrat. According to one of the CSU's Landtag election manifestos, 'Who votes for the CSU votes for a strong representation of Bavaria in the Bundestag. The CSU is the only party that can effectively represent Bavaria'. 40 Rather than pursuing a path of separation from Germany, the CSU prefers to trade-off independence with being a strong player in Germany and Europe, a strategy to which other Bavarian parties have had to respond.
THE TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGE IN BAVARIAN PARTY POLITICS
The regionalist profile of Bavaria's 'party of state' has had a significant impact on party competition. In its quest to defend the Bavarian identity and increase Bavaria's influence in Germany and Europe, the CSU has forced regional branches of statewide parties in Bavaria to enter the territorial debate. Bavarian branches of the Social Democratic Party, the Free Democrats and
Greens have all acknowledged the need to take a more pro-Bavarian stance in order to succeed electorally, and have adopted distinctly territorial identities and policies. 41 Yet such is the strength of the CSU's hegemonic status in the Bavarian party system that the opposition parties in Bavaria have been unable to seriously combat the CSU's hold over Bavarian politics since the 1950s.
The Bavarian Social Democratic Party, which is the oldest party in Bavaria (est. 1892), forms the main opposition to the CSU in the Bavarian Landtag. Scholars have argued that the Bavarian SPD has exhibited a separate identity from its counterparts in Germany, which derives from its operation within a peculiarly CSU-dominated Bavarian political context, as well as its own long-standing sympathy with the need to preserve Bavaria's identity. 42 For instance, during the debates on the German constitution in the 1940s, the Bavarian SPD pushed for a 'strong' type of federalism that gave equal weight to the Bundestag and Bundesrat and decentralised the community and economic structures of the state. This became known as 'der bajuwarische Impetus' (the Bavarian impetus) and differentiated the Bavarian SPD from the federal party. There were other sources of difference. In response to the strongly anti-Left political landscape of Bavaria, the Bavarian SPD became 'more Volkspartei than a class party' long before the German SPD adopted the Godesberg Programme of 1956, in which the party dropped its Marxist roots in its bid to become a 'catch-all' party. 43 In the post-war years, the BayernSPD made various attempts to steal the CSU's thunder as the true Bavarian party, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Some authors have explained this by arguing that the political climate of Bavaria is not amenable to social democratic thinking due to the historical predominance of the Christian-Conservative ideology linked to Bavarian patriotism. 44 Others, like Mintzel, have argued that the Bavarian SPD's weak position is due to its inability to create a Bavarian social democratic counter-culture. 45 Attempts to reform the party in 1990 by achieving Land party status and calling themselves BayernSPD instead of die bayerische SPD were too little too late. In the elections the following year, it failed to overturn its electoral decline or surpass its best election result, 35.8% of the vote in 1966 Landtag elections. Since then, it has been unable to cross the magic '30% threshold', and its support fell to an all-time low in 2003 when it received only 19% in the Landtag election. Efforts to 'Bavarianise' the party, acknowledged to be necessary by party officials to combat the CSU, also broke with the internationalist principles of the federal SPD. The SPD's state-centrism even led to demands for the Bavarian party to pursue a relationship similar to that of the CSU and CDU. 46 But even if the branch became independent, it is questionable whether it would be able to convince voters of its pro-Bavarian credentials.
Similar problems existed for the development of Liberalism in Bavaria. The FDP has been hampered by its perception as a Bavarian 'affiliate' of the federal party, and its staunch opposition to regional patriotism and the development of a strong 'Bavarian' profile for the party. For them, regional pride is associated with particularism and exclusivity. To that end, the FDP has always maintained a firmly pro-federal stance in which power is decentralised and as 'close' as possible to the citizens. Yet at the same time, the FDP are no strangers to playing the Bavarian card. The party insists that 'we in Bavaria love our freedom, our independence and our traditions' 47 and during the debates on the reform of German federalism the party wanted 'a strong Bavaria' with autonomous decision-making capacities. 48 Furthermore, the current party leader has acknowledged the fact that the party has to become more Bavarian to win more votes. 49 So far, this strategy has been unsuccessful. The FDP has been unable to cross the 5% hurdle of parliamentary eligibility since being ousted from parliament in 1994, and has since disappeared off the political radar.
There is some indication, however, that a new political tradition is emerging in Bavaria that does not simply say 'Please -we're also from Bavaria!' like the SPD and FDP. 50 Although Green party support is lower in Bavaria than any other Land, the party has managed to politicise the issue of environmentalism and frame it within a Bavarian context. Die Grünen won their first seats in the Bavarian Landtag in 1986, with 7.5% of the vote, some years after the German Green Party was created out of citizen-initiative groups to contest the 1979 European elections. In Bavaria, some scholars argue that the Greens should be considered less an ecological movement and more of a protest movement against the 'unholy trinity' of the Bavarian state, the CSU and the Catholic Church. 51 Yet the party has been slow in committing itself to a specifically Bavarian agenda, due to a large anti-nationalist wing. Nationalism was associated with their main political rival -the CSUand viewed as something that had to be weakened in order to bring about an open multicultural society. Another section of the party, however, believed that a non-or anti-Bavarian party attitude contributed to its 'impotence' (Ohnmacht) in the Land. 52 It was only when the party saw that the regionalisation of Green parties elsewhere was working so well that they also decided to become more Land-focused. 53 This involved the creation of policies that would appeal to the strongly patriotic and conservative Bavarian electorate. In the countryside the Greens sought to woo environmentally-concerned pro-Bavarian conservatives from the CSU, which is something that the SPD was unable to achieve due to its image as a party of the industrial heartlands. Furthermore, in the main towns and cities the Greens appealed to the left-wing anti-CSU vote, thereby eating into SPD electoral support. The Greens' adoption of this dual urban-rural strategy has allowed the party to succeed where the SPD had so far failed. The Greens increased their share of the vote from 5.7%
in the 1998 Landtag election to 7.7% in 2003 -their best ever result. But the Greens' adoption of a more Bavarian image, and their articulation of a multicultural Bavarian Heimat, has yet to effectively challenge the CSU's dominant discourse on nationhood.
PARTY CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE BAVARIAN HEIMAT
The CSU has continuously asserted the existence of Bavaria as an 'imagined community' and has sought to mobilise the population around its construction of the Bavarian Heimat. The Bavarian SPD has been unable to create a social-democratic 'counter-culture' in opposition to the political hegemony of the CSU state. Despite pledges by the Bavarian SPD that 'we will allow nobody, and especially not the CSU, to outstrip our love for this land', 57 this patriotism has not been evident in party programmes or propaganda. One electoral placard in 1978 declared: 'The powerful CSU needs to be checked by a strong Bavarian SPD. Therefore please give us your vote'. 58 According to Sutherland, the SPD has made no attempt challenge the CSU's construction of Heimat, and indeed its image of Bavaria is derived from the CSU's 'world view'. 59 Yet a closer analysis of the SPD's construction of the nation shows that it does differ from the CSU's version. The SPD understand the Bavarian nation as 'our cosmopolitan Bavarian Heimat'
and declared that 'we are a multicultural society'. 60 The party has countered the CSU's version of a homogenous political culture by emphasising Bavaria's diverse regional traditions. This may be considered an electoral strategy as much as an ideological discourse on the Bavarian Heimat. The youths -of different ages, colours and backgrounds -enjoying a drink in a beer garden. And by the late 1990s, the Green Party was holding its party meetings in beer gardens -a strategy that had been monopolised by the CSU. The Greens were clearly moving onto CSU territory -using traditional Bavarian images to appeal to voters. The success of the Green vision of the Bavarian Heimat, has led some authors to argue that the party is the only political force identifiable with a 'counterculture to the political hegemony of the CSU'. 63 But even though the Green Party has begun to challenge the CSU's construction of Bavaria, it is reluctant to mobilise the nation for political ends, or to argue in defence of special Bavarian interests within the FRG.
If Bavaria's opposition parties continue to refrain from fully adopting an explicitly Bavarian identity, it is unlikely that they will ever be able to seriously challenge the hegemony of the CSU. Germany. 64 The findings revealed that within Germany, only Bavarians claimed a strong identification with their Land: 41% identified themselves as 'more Bavarian' whilst 50% considered themselves to be 'more German'. Although the German identity came out strongest, if these results are compared to other Länder it is demonstrated that a minority 41% is in fact very substantial. In the state of Saxony/Thurungia, which came second in terms of regional identification, only 21% identified with their Land, whilst the median rate of identification as 'more German' for the nonBavarian Länder was much higher, at 70%. More recent research has revealed the existence of an even stronger Bavarian identity amongst young people. 65 Bachmann conducted a survey of young voters (aged 18 to 29) to determine their levels of identification with Bavaria, Germany and Europe.
Over 62% of respondents expressed a strong or very strong identification with Bavaria, compared to 48.2% with Germany and 44% with Europe. Her analysis indicated that the strong Bavarian identity amongst young voters helped the CSU, and its image as the Bavarian party, gain electoral support.
Her surveys also revealed that for many, supporting Bavaria and voting CSU was the same thing.
Evidence that this sense of national identification was linked to the CSU was provided in a support the CSU because it is seen to reflect their strong sense of Bavarian identity, and also because it is seen to stand up for Bavaria against the (then) incumbent SPD-Green federal government. This is a status that the SPD, FDP and Greens, hamstrung by their all-German profiles, have failed to achieve.
A EUROPE OF THE REGIONS
Debates about Bavaria's autonomy within Germany have been strongly affected by developments in
Europe. The CSU has throughout its history been a firm and enthusiastic advocate of the principle of European integration. 67 Franz Joseph Strauss, for instance, saw European integration as a way for uniting the 'two Germanies' and a bulwark to the socialist-communist Europe to the east. Moreover, economic integration was seen as providing new markets for the robust business community in Bavaria. However, in the late 1980s the CSU began to fear that Land competences were being transferred to the EU level whilst the Basic Law remained 'europablind'. 68 Bavaria's hard-won autonomy appeared to be under threat by Europe intruding on its laws, powers and society. In response, the CSU-led Bavarian government sought to halt, and even push back, some of the Bavaria was at the forefront of demands to entrench Länder rights to prevent further European encroachments on their autonomy. 70 The CSU argued that the EU should be subject to the same scrutiny and criticism as the German federal government, and became openly critical of policies it considered to compromise or threaten Bavarian interests. In order to make its demands and criticisms known, the CSU developed several direct and indirect institutional routes to Europe.
As party of regional government, the CSU lobbied the European Commission through its regional office (which is larger than that of some member states) in Brussels, through its active leadership alongside member states and the EU, and Brussels should only take decisions in the event that the issue cannot be dealt with at a lower level. This structure amounts to a European Staatenverbund (confederation) rather than a Bundesstaat (federal state), so that the EU is structured on intergovernmental lines, rather than decisions being issued from Brussels. The way in which the CSU is able to reconcile its support for an (state-based) intergovernmental Europe with a regionalised one is through a careful elaboration of the concept of subsidiarity. This means that 'decisions are to be taken where one can judge them best' and is designed to empower the lowest level of decision-making, which for the CSU means the region (Bavaria). 72 This interpretation of subsidiarity allows the CSU to support the integrity and sovereignty of the member states of the EU, whilst also believing that European states must give up some of their sovereignty.
Initially, the idea of strengthening the position of the Länder in a regionalised Europe was warmly welcomed by parties across the Bavarian political spectrum. However, the way in which the opposition parties interpret the concept of a 'Europe of the Regions' differs considerably from the CSU's version, which has evolved to mean a 'Europe of the Citizens' for the Liberals, and a 'Europe of the Communes' for the Greens and SPD. Bavaria's opposition parties have criticised the centralisation of power at the Bavarian level by arguing for greater decentralisation to levels beneath the region in a 'Europe of the Regions within the Regions'. So far, as we have seen, these strategies have been largely unsuccessful. But since the mid-1990s, the CSU also downplayed its goal of creating a Europe of the Regions, though for other reasons. Since the failure of the CoR to become anything other than a weak advisory body, and the impasse regarding regional developments in European institutions, the CSU has tried another track in Europe. It sought to lobby for the protection of its competences within the German federal state, rather than focusing exclusively on increasing regional rights of participation in Europe. In particular, its disappointment with the draft European Constitution, which failed to include significant rights for the regions, was one of the main reasons why the CSU sought to push for constitutional reform of the German state (another motivation was to extract greater fiscal autonomy for the Laender, which is also linked to European integration and the need for greater regional competitiveness to succeed in the single market). As Jeffery has argued, the CSU's central guiding philosophy has been: if you protect the 'hard shell' of the state, you also protect the Länder. 73 The experience of the CSU in Europe shows how parties operating at the regional level have been forced to respond to the new challenges, as well as opportunities, of multi-level governance.
The creation of multiple loci of decision-making, and multiple arenas of political conflict and party competition, has necessitated the development of multiple strategies by parties. Thus, within
Bavaria the CSU positions itself as the defender of Bavaria interests and identity. In Germany, the CSU has sought to strengthen its voice in German federal policy-making channels to influence Bavaria is referred to as a Freistaat -a Land with distinct territorial interests, and in Bavaria itself, the CSU refers to the territory as Heimat, evoking strong cultural associations. The CSU has thus chosen to engage in the politics of multilevel governance, and to 'build' the Bavarian nation within the larger contexts of Germany and Europe, from which is has tried to extract as many concessions and benefits as possible to secure Bavarian territorial interests.
CONCLUSION
This article has explored the territorial strategy of the CSU in relation to the emerging system of multi-level governance in Europe. It has also examined, at the substate level, the impact of the analytically contested social construct that may be called by a variety of names -and in the case of Bavaria, the CSU mobilises around the concept of Heimat as a unit of shared identity. The CSU has been instrumental in forging a strong sense of Bavarian identity by overcoming historic and sociocultural divisions within the Land. It has also succeeded in linking its party identity to the Bavarian
Heimat to the extent that the CSU, and the Land it has governed for over sixty years, seem inextricable. The CSU has thus been able to monopolise the Bavarian national identity vis-à-vis its competitors in the regional party system. These have included parties representing more extreme Bavarian nationalist and German nationalist sensibilities -such as the Bayernpartei and
Republikaner -in addition to regional branches of statewide parties. In the last few years, the Bavarian SPD, Greens and FDP have each acknowledged the need to engage in identity politics in Bavaria, and to position themselves as standing up for Bavarian interests in Germany and Europe.
However, branches of statewide parties still lack the same degree of organisational and programmatic autonomy as the CSU does from the CDU, which would allow them to portray themselves as fighting for Bavarian interests either at the Land or federal level. They continue to be perceived in Bavaria as German parties beholden to Berlin. This has left the CSU virtually unchallenged on the territorial dimension of party competition. The only party that has posed some threat to the CSU in this area is the Bavarian Green Party. In contrast to the other statewide parties, the Greens have sought to construct a counter-culture to the CSU and to develop an alternative understanding of Bavarian Heimat as open, pluralistic and multicultural that still appeals to 'Old Bavarian' traditions. Moreover, the Greens have been able to pursue a dual strategy that appeals to both conservative sentiment in rural areas, and to progressive sentiment in urban areas. In this way, the Greens have become more of a 'catch-all' party in conservative Bavaria than even the SPD, which has been weakened by divisions with the statewide party about how to approach the regional question, as well as the party's limited appeal in rural areas. However, the continuing strength and attractiveness of the CSU to Bavarian voters as the party of Bavaria is evident in the impressive election results of the CSU, where today the party continues to obtain over 60% of regional vote -a result that the Green Party has thus far been hardly able to dent (with less than 10% of the vote).
In a broader context, the case of Bavaria exemplifies how the reconfiguration of the state in response to European integration has forced regionalist parties to alter their territorial strategies to account for increasing interdependence across borders, and the new distributions of competences across different territorial levels. The CSU's efforts to grasp the opportunities of European integration for substate territories, whilst maintaining the benefits of being part of the German federation, is akin to the demands of the vast majority of regionalist parties in Europe that seek to negotiate their autonomy within state and European structures. 74 The new constellations of power created by multilevel governance in Europe have also required statewide parties to refocus their strategies for the regional setting, as well as developing alternative visions of European integration and the place of Bavaria within these processes. Thus, the Bavarian SPD, Greens and FDP advocate a 'Europe of the Communes' to contrast with the CSU's 'Europe of the Regions', which is seen to unduly centralise powers at the Bavarian state level. Clearly, the CSU is no longer -or ever has been -the only party with a distinct Bavarian or European territorial strategy, and its construction of the Bavarian Heimat has been challenged by alternative conceptions of a multicultural Bavaria.
But whilst opposition parties have welcomed the greater Europeanisation of Bavaria, as understood as increasing cultural diversity, the CSU -under pressure from the right-wing Republikaner -has rejected any notion of multiculturalism and diversity associated with EU norms and supranational integration. This aspect of Europe is viewed as an encroachment on Bavarian autonomy, and a threat to Bavaria's culture, identity and sense of nationhood.
